In this work, we seek to understand the interaction between different tiers of ISPs. The lower tier ISPs can transmit traffic to each other, either by purchasing the service from higher tier ISPs, or by setting "private peering links" between themselves. Higher tier ISPs cannot charge the transit service at will since there is competition among higher tier ISPs. We model the interaction of these ISPs via a game theoretic approach. We study the issues of (a) impact of private peering relationship among the lower tier ISPs, (b) under a competitive market, how can the higher tier ISPs perform resource allocation and revenue maximization, (c) conditions wherein higher tier ISPs are willing to perform network upgrade, in particular, when we scale up the network. Our mathematical framework provides insights on the interaction among ISPs and shows these ISPs can still gain profits as they upgrade the network infrastructures.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE CURRENT Internet is formed by many different internet service providers (ISPs) which provide connectivity and transit service. One of the main problems facing ISPs is how to increase the profit and at the same time, sustain good performance as the Internet grows. For the lower tier ISPs, they need to purchase the transit service from higher tier ISPs. These higher tier ISPs set their prices based on the service provisioning, and the prices depend on the allocated bandwidth, the amount of transferred traffic, as well as the competitive prices from other higher tier ISPs. Note that for lower tier have an option to set up "private peering links" among themselves so that they can bypass the higher tier ISPs and reduce their operating costs. In practice, these private peering agreements can be quite complicated. In [4] , [3] , authors discuss how a provider should price its services differentially based on their characteristics such that prices can match service qualities.
In [1] , [11] , [12] , authors study the economics of network pricing with multiple ISPs. They study a basic question of how to set prices for the Internet services so as to fairly share revenues among providers and at the same time, encourage the network to grow. However, these work underestimate the impact of two important factors: (a) pricing competition among higher tier ISPs and, (b) local peering relationship on the traffic demand. These factors have great impact on the proper pricing strategy. The aim of this work is to seek a fundamental understanding of the interaction between Manuscript ISPs with peering links and competition. We explore how the peering relationship and competition among higher tier ISPs can affect the service purchasing strategies and pricing strategies. For a lower tier ISP, it has two options to communicate with another lower tier ISP: either use the connection provided by higher tier ISPs, or to use the private peering link between the two peers. Deciding on the proper routing via these two connections is not trivial. Note that lower tier ISPs want to maximize their own utilities and reduce their operating costs to the higher tier ISPs, and an ISP's strategy may depend on strategies taken by other ISPs, as well as the pricing policies set by the higher tier ISPs. For the higher tier ISP, its main goal is to maximize its profit by attracting more potential lower tier ISPs. To maximize the profit, a higher tier ISP needs to address: (a) profit maximization, (b) bandwidth allocation, (c) whether to perform network upgrade,
The contribution of our paper is to answer the above questions. We use a "game theoretic" approach to study the interaction of the two types of ISPs and illustrate the impact of private peering in the competitive market. In particular, (1) We present a generalized competitive model that captures the pricing competition among the higher tier ISPs and traffic demand and routing decision of the lower tier ISPs. (2) We show how lower tier ISPs can distributively determine their transmission and routing decisions. (3) We propose a distributed algorithm for higher tier ISPs to allocate their bandwidth resources to lower tier ISPs. (4) We show how a higher tier ISP can infer an optimal pricing so as to maximize its profit. (5) We derive conditions wherein higher tier ISPs have the incentive to upgrade the backbone capacity.
II. NETWORK AND GAME-THEORETIC MODELS
To provide connection service for various lower tier ISPs, each higher tier ISP k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}, has a network that has a total capacity of n k C k . For each lower tier ISP i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, it possesses at most m links to each higher tier ISPs and possibly n − 1 private peering links to other lower tier peers. The private peering link between peer i and peer j is denoted as l ij and this link has a capacity of c ij . The link connecting lower tier ISP i and the higher tier ISP k is denoted as l k i , and the higher tier ISP k allocates C k i amount of bandwidth for this connection. Let n k be the number of lower tier ISPs buying connection service from the higher tier ISP k, and G i is the set of higher tier ISPs in which the lower tier ISP i is buying connection service from, H k is the set of lower tier ISPs in which the higher tier ISP k is providing connection service to. This network model is a generalization 0733-8716/08/$25.00 c 2008 IEEE of the network model in [7] wherein only a single higher tier ISP was considered (therefore, in [7] , there is no competition among higher tier ISPs).
Let x ij denote the traffic transmission rate from lower tier ISP i to lower tier ISP j. If the transmission rate can be supported, then the lower tier ISP i obtains a utility of A ij (x ij ) where A ij is a strictly concave function in x ij . A weighted log function is used such that A ij (x ij ) = w ij log(1+x ij ). For the traffic from lower tier ISP i to j it can either go through the private link l ij , or through any mutually connected higher tier ISPs. We denote y ij as the traffic rate that ISP i decides to transmit through the link l ij , and z k ij as the traffic rate through the link of ISP k, l k i . Therefore, the traffic rate x ij is equal to
. . , n}. One special case is for the traffic rate x ii , representing the traffic from ISP i to destinations other than the n − 1 lower tier ISPs, which are outside this network. This type of traffic has to go through the higher tier ISPs, we have y ii = 0 and x ii = k∈Gi z k ii for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. To simplify notation, let z k i = j∈Ti z k ij be the aggregate traffic rate that ISP i sends through the higher tier ISP k andz k = i∈H k z k i is the aggregate traffic from all lower tier ISPs to the higher tier ISP k, where T i is the set of lower tier ISPs in which ISP i wants to send data to.
Lower tier ISPs also care about the "quality" of their service. In here, we use congestion as an indicator for the quality of service. Assuming links can be represented as an M/M/1 queue [1] , the delay on the link can be treated as a congestion indication. In order to provide these congestion indicators to the connected lower tier ISPs, the higher tier ISP k will perform appropriate bandwidth resource allocation (which will be presented in later section) and broadcast its allocation to the lower tier ISP i as C k i . Under this framework, the congestion cost of link l ij is 1 cij −yij and the cost of link l k i is 1
. Now we formulate the mathematical optimization for each lower tier ISP. Considering the lower tier ISP i, it wants to maximize the following objective function:
where 1 {p} is an indicator function and the set S i is the collection of peers having private peering links established with lower tier ISP i. The above objective function in Eq.(1) represents the economic incentive for ISP i to carry out traffic transmission. The first term in the objective function
is the happiness of ISP i in sending data to ISP j through its connecting links. The second term
is the congestion cost of ISP i experienced in sending traffic through the link of the higher tier ISP k. The variable γ > 0 represents the congestion cost impact to a lower tier ISP and it translates the congestion cost into an appropriate monetary value. Note that the larger the value of γ indicates that lower tier ISPs are more concern about the congestion. In later section, we will show the the impact of γ on the convergence point of the traffic transmission rates. Note that the congestion cost will be zero if ISP i does not transmit via this link, or the ISP did not purchase transit service from the higher tier ISP k. The term P k i z k i is the total payment of lower tier ISP i to the higher tier ISP k. Also, γ cij−yij is the congestion cost on the private peering link between lower tier ISPs i and j when the traffic rate on l ij is non-zero. Lastly, ISP i needs to pay p ij y ij to lower tier ISP j for using the private link (note: it is possible to model free peering by setting p ij = p ji = 0). Last but not least, the happiness, congestion cost and payment are mapped to the same monetary domain with w ij and γ. The constraints represented in Eq.(2) specify the feasible region of the optimization problem. The first constraints are non-negative and capacity constraints of the peering links. The second constraint is due to the absence of peering links. The third and fourth are the capacity and nonnegative constraints of links of higher tier ISPs respectively. In summary, each lower tier ISP i needs to determine the traffic rates vectors y i and z k i for all k ∈ G i so as to maximize its utility as defined in Eq.(1).
We model the interaction between ISPs as a "noncooperative game". Under the game theoretic framework, for a given collection of price vectors of ISPs P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P m ), this defines a non-cooperative game between these n lower tier ISPs. They interact with each other and determine their optimal traffic rates. Given the existence of an equilibrium point, the operating point for n lower tier ISPs is the solution to the Nash equilibrium of this game. For each collection of price vectors P > 0, a Nash equilibrium point for this n-ISPs game is defined as two n-tuples y * = ( y * 1 , y * 2 , . . . , y * n ) and
, such that for all lower tier ISPs i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we have U i (y * , z * , P) ≥ U i (y, z, P), for any other feasible traffic vector y = ( y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y n ) and z = ( z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n ) that satisfies the constraints defined in Eq.(2). For a higher tier ISP, say k, it has to solve a profit maximization problem: max P k ·z k * (P k ) over P ≥ 0. wherē z k * (P k ) is the aggregate traffic on the link of ISP k at the Nash equilibrium. We assume homogeneous pricing. Therefore, P k i = P k for all i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and k ∈ {1, · · · , m}. This equivalently defines a Stackelberg game with m leaders (the higher tier ISPs) and n non-cooperative Nash followers (the lower tier ISPs).
III. SOLUTION TO THE UTILITY MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM OF LOWER TIER ISPS
In this section, we show how a lower tier ISP, say i, can determine its optimal transmission rates and routing. The transmission rate vector is z k i for k ∈ G i , to other lower tier ISPs via the links of higher tier ISPs, and y i , is the transmission rate vector via peering links. Assuming that the lower tier ISP knows all the prices P k and the associated bandwidth allocations C k i for k ∈ G i specified by the connected higher tier ISPs, one can model this as a convex optimization problem as defined in Eq.(1). We first consider the case where the traffic rate is non-zero.
Necessary conditions for positive transmission rate:
We first consider the case where the traffic rate is non-zero. Since U i is discontinuous at y ij = 0 (i.e., the traffic rate through the peering link l ij is zero) and z k i = 0 (i.e., the traffic rate through the link of the higher tier ISP k is zero), we first show the necessary conditions when y ij = 0 and z k i = 0. The optimization of Eq.(1) has |T i ||G i |+|S i | variables. The second order partial derivatives with respect to y ij and z k ij are:
For j 1 = j 2 = i ∈ S i and k 1 ∈ G i , the second order partial derivatives of Eq.(1) with respect to y ij and z k1 ij are:
and for j 1 = j 2 = i ∈ T i and k 1 = k 2 ∈ G i , the second order partial derivatives of Eq.(1) with respect to y ij and z k ij are:
Therefore, the Hessian matrix of the objective function in Eq.(1) is negative definite on the non-negative space bounded by y ij ≤ c ij and z k i ≤ C k i . So U i is strictly concave in y ij for j ∈ S i and z k ij for all j ∈ T i and k ∈ G i . The maximum utility and optimizer to this problem is unique and can be found by the Lagrangian method. The necessary conditions of y ij for j ∈ S i and z k ij for j ∈ T i and k ∈ G i of the maximization of U i are:
For the boundary conditions and their physical interpretation on positive transmission rate, please refer to [8] .
IV. DISTRIBUTED BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION BY HIGHER TIER ISPS
For a higher tier ISP, it has to determine the proper bandwidth allocation to its connected customers (e.g., lower tier ISPs) and at the same time, it needs to make sure that there is no bandwidth monopolization by a small number of lower tier ISPs. Moreover, in order to maximize its revenue or profit, a higher tier ISP has to know the demand in its link bandwidth. Given the total amount of link bandwidth resource n k C k , higher tier ISP k needs to determine how to distribute this common resource to the n k lower tier ISPs.
First, let us present the general framework under which the higher tier ISPs can interact with their customers so that they can discover the actual resource demands from these lower tier ISPs. Also, how lower tier ISPs are informed the pricing information and the bandwidth resources. Initially, each higher tier ISP k for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} equally distributes its link capacity to all its connected lower tier ISP i ∈ H k , at time t = 0. Knowing the available link capacities C j and link prices P j for j ∈ G i , each lower tier ISP i calculates its optimal routing (traffic transmission rates vectors) with the algorithm presented in Section III. The lower tier ISP sends the link bandwidth consumption, z j i , back to each higher tier ISP j ∈ G i . We call the feedback information z j i as bidding of lower tier ISP i to higher tier ISP j. Higher tier ISP k receives all the biddings from its connected lower tier ISPs within a period of time T . At the end of each period, higher tier ISP k recomputes the link resource allocation and sends the new allocation C k i to each connected lower tier ISP i, where i ∈ H k . Based on the new bandwidth allocation, each lower tier ISP calculates its optimal routing again and the process repeats itself. Note that there are several advantages for this framework. First, all the information that a lower tier ISP i requires are the unit prices p ij 's and capacities c ij 's of its private links, and the allocated link capacities C j i and prices P j for j ∈ G i . These can be viewed as the private information of lower tier ISP i. Lower tier ISP i does not have to know the bandwidth allocations (C j 1 , . . . , C j n ) and bandwidth consumptions (z k 1 , . . . , z k n ) since they are confidential information. Secondly, when the higher tier ISP k makes the bandwidth allocation, it only has to know the biddings (z k 1 , z k 2 , . . . , z k n ) from its connected ISPs and it needs not know the utility functions and the pricing information of the private peering links. Thirdly, the overhead of exchanging the control information in the framework is very small.
The distributed resource allocation algorithm is called the Equal Share Algorithm. At each round, a higher tier ISP distributes its "remaining" capacity equally among all lower tier ISPs after satisfying their bandwidth consumption demands indicated by their biddings. Initially, each higher tier ISP k for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} allocates its link capacity equally to every lower tier ISP, i.e., C k i = n k C k n k = C k and sends the capacity allocation C k i to every lower tier ISP i for all i ∈ H k , Then each lower tier ISP applies the algorithm proposed in Section III to find its optimal bandwidth consumption (i.e., z k i for lower tier ISP i) and sends the information back to the higher tier ISP k as its resource bidding. When a higher tier ISP gathers all the feedbacks from its connected ISPs, it allocates to each lower tier ISP the capacity it bids, and then it allocates the remaining resource equally to them. Formally, the allocation is 
for every lower tier ISP i ∈ H k ; update counter t := t + 1; 8. } / * termination of while-loop * / Please refer to [8] for the illustrations and experimental results of the Equal Sharing Algorithm.
V. PROFIT MAXIMIZATION FOR HIGHER TIER ISPS
For the higher tier ISPs, the most important issue is how to maximize one's profit. The profit of a higher tier ISP is the total payments received from its connected lower tier ISPs. One can express the profit maximization as:
The notation z k i (P k ) represents the bandwidth consumption on higher tier ISP k by a lower tier ISP and it is a function of the unit price P k which is decided by the higher tier ISP k. If the price P k is set too high, the lower tier ISPs may switch their traffic to the other higher tier ISPs. On the other hand, a lower price attracts lower tier ISPs for transit service but setting too low a price causes a decrease in profit.
We propose an efficient method to estimate the price. This method requires a quick estimation of the aggregate bandwidth consumptionz k (P k ) for a fixed unit price P k . With the estimate ofz k (P k ), one can easily calculate the profit of the higher tier ISP k by Eq. (8) . Our estimation has the following four assumptions: (1) All higher tier ISPs apply the ESA proposed in Sec. IV in allocating the bandwidth resource. (2) Every higher tier ISP takes an indiscriminate pricing approach and charges the same unit price to all connected lower tier ISPs. (3) Every higher tier ISP is providing transit service for all n lower tier ISPs. (4) When higher tier ISP k maximizes its profit, it only considers the case of z k ij > 0 for all i ∈ H k .
A. Estimation of aggregate bandwidth consumptionz k1
To estimate the aggregate bandwidth consumption (or biddings), we introduce a variable t k1 , which represents the marginal increase in congestion cost plus payment in transmitting data through higher tier ISP k 1 . The purpose of introducing the variable t k1 is that one can represent the aggregate biddingsz k1 in terms of t k1 . Given a unit price P k1 , to estimate the revenue R k1 (P k1 ), one can first estimate the value of t k1 , then estimates the aggregate biddingsz k1 and revenue R k1 (P k1 ). Under the ESA and at the equilibrium point of the biddings by lower tier ISPs, we have
For detail derivation ofz k1 , please refer to [8] . In summary, we havē
After some algebraic manipulation, we have
Higher tier ISP k 1 can compute the value of t k1 with Eq. (11), then find the total biddings and use Eq.(8) to find its profit.
B. Optimal Pricing Search Method
Our pricing search method has two phases. In phase one, we obtain a feasible range of the optimum unit price with the help of the estimates of aggregate traffic in section V-A. Phase two aims at reducing the size of the feasible range obtained in phase one by trisection method. The search method is:
Pricing Search Method: 1. Higher tier ISP initiates a step size σ and a threshold δ. 2. /* Phase 1: */ 3.
Higher tier ISP computes four unit prices P 1 = σ, P 2 = 2P 1 , P 3 = 2P 2 and P 4 = 2P 3 .
5.
Higher tier ISP computes four revenues R(P 1 ), R(P 2 ), R(P 3 ) and R(P 4 ).
6.
if (R(P 3 ) > R(P 4 )) 7.
break; / * go to phase 2 * / 8. else 9. σ = 2σ / * go back to phase 1 * / 10.
} / * termination of while-loop of phase 1 * / 11. /* Phase 2: */ 12.
return P 1 ; break; 15. else if (R(P 2 ) < R(P 3 )) 16.
update P 1 = P 2 , P 2 = P 3 and P 3 = P2+P4 2 .
17.
else if (R(P 2 ) > R(P 3 )) 18.
update P 4 = P 3 , P 3 = P 2 and P 2 = P1+P3 2 .
19.
} / * termination of while-loop of phase 2 * / Please refer to [8] for the physical interpretation of the algorithm.
In summary, we present the procedure for a higher tier ISP to estimate the total bandwidth consumption from its customers and also its revenue, with a fixed unit price on its link, and we show that the estimate and optimal pricing search method are efficient and the result is independent of initial values.
Lemma 1: The final converged price vectors computed by the optimal pricing search method is the Nash Equilibrium of the pricing game. Proof: Let P −j = (P 1 , . . . , P j−1 , P j+1 , . . . , P m ) denote the price strategies of all higher tier ISPs except ISP j. When higher tier ISP k 1 searches for its optimal price P k1 , the estimations of k =k1 nC k , i j =i c ij and p av are unchanged, so the solutions of t k1 are a function of P k1 and P −k1 . For consistent strategies of other higher tier ISPs P −k1 , the optimal price P k1 is unique. Therefore, the price vectors computed by the optimal pricing search method is the Nash Equilibrium of the price game.
VI. PERFORMANCE UNDER NETWORK SCALING
Let us consider the performance of the network when we scale up the number of ISPs. When there are more lower tier ISPs, the demand in transmitting through higher tier ISPs increases. On the other hand, the link capacity allocated to each lower tier ISP becomes smaller, which reduces the QoS guarantee. One important question for a higher tier ISP is that if it can get more profit (or increased revenue) by performing network upgrade? Furthermore, other higher tier ISPs may also upgrade their capacities and there are more private peering links among the lower tier ISPs. These factors make it complicated to decide whether one should perform network upgrade. Our investigation is built on the results obtained in Section V. We have an estimate of the aggregate bandwidth consumption on the transit service of a higher tier ISP. If a higher tier ISP knows some information of the network environment, e.g., estimates of the aggregate happiness coefficients of its customers, pricing policies and link capacities of the peering links and other higher tier ISPs, then it has an opportunity to infer its optimal pricing strategy to maximize its revenue. In general, the pricing policies and capacities of private peering links and other higher tier ISPs are regarded as confidential information which is difficult to obtain, yet rough estimates of them allow a higher tier ISP to make the its marketing decision. Another utility of our results is to predict how the number of lower tier ISPs affects the maximum revenue of a higher tier ISP at its optimal pricing. This provides an important insight as we scale up the network. In the following, we will consider under two different situations: 1) there is no peering link between lower tier ISPs, and 2) lower tier ISPs set up peering relationships in a meshed peering manner.
A. Network Scaling without peering links among lower tier ISPs:
As lower tier ISPs have only links connecting to higher tier ISPs, they must transmit through those links to communicate with each other. From the analysis in Section V, we know that when there is no peering link, i.e. y ij = 0, Eq.(11) holds and it can be approximated as:
whereinw is the average happiness coefficient of all lower tier ISPs. The condition for Eq.(11) to hold are P k < t k1 ≤ γ c 2 ij + p ij for all i, j. This condition represents when there is no private peering link (i.e., c ij = 0), or the congestion cost plus payment to transmit data in peering link is too expensive. Applying the optimal pricing search method in Section V-B, the maximum revenue of higher tier ISP k 1 can be calculated under different values of m and n. Figure 1 illustrates the maximum revenue of higher tier ISP k 1 against the number of lower tier ISPs n, for different numbers of higher tier ISPs m in the network. In this figure, all the m higher tier ISPs do not perform network upgrade even when there are increasing number of lower tier ISPs joining the network. So we keep nC k = 100 for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m}. Figure 2 illustrates when the higher tier ISP k 1 's link capacity increases proportionally to the number of lower tier ISPs in the network. Higher tier ISP k 1 has a total capacity of nC k1 where C k1 = 100 is a constant. The other higher tier ISPs have link unit price P k = 1.2 and do not perform network upgrade and have fixed capacities, i.e. nC k = 100 for k = k 1 . Figure 2(a) illustrates the maximum revenue of higher tier ISP k 1 as a function of the number of lower tier ISPs, with different number of higher tier ISPs in the network. The figure shows that when higher tier ISP k 1 upgrades its link capacity, no matter how many other higher tier ISPs are, it can always achieve an increasing revenue as n increases, which is a contrast to the fixed-capacity case. Furthermore, the revenue is able to increase faster than n does. Figure 2(b) shows the relationship between higher tier ISP k 1 's maximal revenue per bandwidth (z k1 P k1 * /nC k1 ) and the number of lower tier ISPs, with different number of higher tier ISPs. It shows that higher tier ISP k 1 's maximal revenue per bandwidth keeps increasing as n grows, which implies that the higher tier ISP k 1 can benefit from upgrading its network. 
B. Network scaling with private peering links among lower tier ISPs:
Since there are private peering links, traffic can go through the peering link if the peering link provides a certain level of QoS and the price in transmitting is not high. With the existence of private peering links, we investigate whether there is any incentive for higher tier ISPs to perform network upgrade. In Section V, we showed that the optimality condition holds if y ij > 0. The conditions for y ij > 0 holds are t k1 ≥ γ
Based on the proposed procedure, one can calculate the higher tier ISP k 1 's maximum revenue for different values of n and m. When a higher tier ISP k upgrades its link bandwidth proportional to the number of lower tier ISPs n, its link capacity is nC k where C k = 100 is constant. When it does not perform upgrade, its link capacity nC k = 100 is constant. We perform the analysis under the settings m = 10 and P k = 0.8 for all k = k 1 , w ij = 10 for all i, j and p ij = 1, c ij = 10 for all lower tier ISPs j = i. Figure 3 illustrates how the number of lower tier ISPs affects the maximum revenue of higher tier ISP k 1 . The y-axis shows the maximal revenue per bandwidth of higher tier ISP k 1 when there is no higher tier ISP upgrades link capacity, or when only When the private peering links are introduced, if no higher tier ISP upgrades link capacity, increasing number of lower tier ISPs will lead to the decrease of revenue of all higher tier ISPs. This is caused by the increasing congestion cost in transmitting traffic through the higher tier ISP as link capacity shared becomes less. So lower tier ISPs opt to transmit through their own peering links. If only higher tier ISP k 1 upgrades link capacity, the lower tier ISPs still do not transmit traffic through the other higher tier ISPs due to the large congestion cost. However, they will send traffic through higher tier ISP k 1 as the congestion cost is small. So there is an increase in the maximal revenue per bandwidth when more lower tier ISPs join the network. Lastly, when all higher tier ISPs perform network upgrade, the maximum revenue of higher tier ISP k 1 can still increase and the rate of maximal revenue per bandwidth does not drop. For all scenarios, when compared to the case without peering links, the revenue increasing rate becomes much slower. This is due to the fact that lower tier ISPs have set up peering links to form a mesh-network. It is the competition that brings down the marginal profits of higher tier ISPs. It is worthwhile to mention that in practice, it may be difficult, or even impossible, for all lower tier ISPs to form a fully meshed network among themselves. This may be due to the geographical constraint that some of them are located very far apart, or may be due to the legal regulations. Thus there are still great opportunities for higher tier ISPs to gain by upgrading the network infrastructures.
VII. RELATED WORK
In [2] , authors study a cost model for peers in deciding whether to join a P2P network. There are some work on the game-theoretic study of ISP traffic [15] and overlay traffic interaction and service differentiation [5] , [9] In [6] , [10] , [13] , [14] , authors propose models on Internet pricing, but they focus on customer pricing strategy and issues to provide differentiated service. Our work focused on the "interactions" between the higher tier and lower tier ISPs. In [12] , authors consider a network of local and transit ISPs and show that positive profit is achieved using threat strategies. Our work provide a methodology to obtain the optimal pricing for higher tier ISP charging the local ISPs. In [1] , authors provide a novel model and the work is a pioneering work of studying ISP's interaction. The model is for two-layers and shows the price for the network to maximize its revenue. The work also shows the revenue per unit bandwidth increases and overall performance of each user improves when the number of users increases. In [7] , authors investigate the issues of revenue maximization and network scalability of ISP, where there is only one higher tier ISP. The work also show the rationale for an ISP to perform network upgrade.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigate in the interactions between two layers of ISPs. The lower tier ISPs can transmit traffic to other lower tier ISPs and they want to obtain the maximum utilities while minimizing the congestion cost and payment. The higher tier ISPs, want to attract more customers (or lower tier ISPs) and maximize their revenue or profit. However, they cannot price the service at will since there is competition among the higher tier ISPs. The higher tier ISPs also need to determine the appropriate amount of bandwidth allocation to their customers so as to avoid monopoly by few customers. In this paper, we show how the lower tier ISPs can determine the appropriate traffic transmission and routing so as to maximize their utility. We also present a distributed algorithm for higher tier ISPs to allocate bandwidth resource such that resource monopoly can be avoided. We show the methodology for higher tier ISPs to compute their optimal prices where their maximum revenues are reached. Finally, we demonstrate through experiments that a higher tier ISP can obtain a larger revenue in all circumstances if it performs network upgrade, especially when we scale up the network. The above models are particularly interesting since one can use them to understand the economic impact as well as the behavior as the Internet grows. Due to the unaccommodating page limit and over page charge set by the IEEE communication society, the readers are urged to refer to [8] for detail derivation and results.
